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PORT=3001 # Port to run the server on
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# HOST=0.0.0.0 # Bind address for the HTTP server. Only set this when running TREK from sources or via the Proxmox community script — never in Docker (the container handles binding).
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NODE_ENV=development # development = development mode; production = production mode
fix: decouple at-rest encryption from JWT_SECRET, add JWT rotation
Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets
(API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that
rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data,
and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials.
- server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to
data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET);
switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the
CJS module binding live for all importers without restart
- apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from
ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET
- admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret,
persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding
via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry
- Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button
with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be
invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately
- docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml,
secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document
ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
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# ENCRYPTION_KEY=<random-256-bit-hex> # Separate key for encrypting stored secrets (API keys, MFA, SMTP, OIDC, etc.)
# Auto-generated and persisted to ./data/.encryption_key if not set.
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# Upgrade from a version that used JWT_SECRET for encryption: set to your old JWT_SECRET value so
# existing encrypted data remains readable, then re-save credentials via the admin panel.
fix: decouple at-rest encryption from JWT_SECRET, add JWT rotation
Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets
(API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that
rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data,
and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials.
- server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to
data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET);
switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the
CJS module binding live for all importers without restart
- apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from
ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET
- admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret,
persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding
via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry
- Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button
with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be
invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately
- docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml,
secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document
ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
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# Generate with: node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))"
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TZ=UTC # Timezone for logs, reminders and scheduled tasks (e.g. Europe/Berlin)
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# DEFAULT_LANGUAGE=en # Default language on the login page for users with no saved preference (default: en)
# Supported values: de, en, es, fr, hu, nl, br, cs, pl, ru, zh, zh-TW, it, ar
# Note: browser/OS language is detected automatically first; this is the fallback when no match is found.
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LOG_LEVEL=info # info = concise user actions; debug = verbose admin-level details
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ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://trek.example.com # Comma-separated origins for CORS and email links
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FORCE_HTTPS=false # Optional. When true: HTTPS redirect + HSTS + CSP upgrade-insecure-requests + secure cookies. Only behind a TLS proxy.
fix: hot fixes 23-04-2026 (#856)
* fix(packing): resolve avatar URL path in bag and category assignees (#854)
packingService was returning raw avatar filenames from the DB instead of
the full /uploads/avatars/<filename> path, causing broken profile images
for users with uploaded avatars.
* fix(budget): use Map.get() to fix category rename no-op (#855)
* fix(security): relax Referrer-Policy and document HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS (#862) (#863)
- Change Helmet default from no-referrer to strict-origin-when-cross-origin
so browsers send the origin on cross-origin requests, allowing Google Maps
API key restrictions by HTTP referrer to work correctly
- Document HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS in all deployment artifacts:
.env.example, docker-compose.yml, README.md, unraid-template.xml,
charts/values.yaml, charts/configmap.yaml, wiki/Environment-Variables.md
* fix(planner): prefetch budget items on trip page mount (#864)
Loads budgetItems alongside reservations when TripPlannerPage mounts so
the Budget category dropdown in ReservationModal and TransportModal shows
pre-existing categories on first open, regardless of whether the Budget
tab has been visited.
Closes #861
* fix(reservations): prevent Invalid Date when end time is set without end date (#866)
When reservation_end_time held a bare time string ("HH:MM"), fmtDate()
produced Invalid Date on the reservation card.
- Modal: when end date is blank but end time is filled, construct a
same-day ISO datetime using the start date (prevents time-only strings
from ever being persisted)
- Panel: derive endDatePart via regex so date-only end values ("YYYY-MM-DD")
still show the multi-day range, while bare time strings are skipped and
handled correctly by the existing time column logic
Closes #860
* fix(planner): format reservation end time instead of rendering raw ISO string (#867)
Closes #859
* fix(planner): wire Route toggle into mobile day sidebar (#850) (#868)
The per-booking Route icon was missing on mobile because the mobile
DayPlanSidebar invocation in TripPlannerPage didn't pass
visibleConnectionIds or onToggleConnection. Mobile PWA users couldn't
activate reservation map overlays without forcing desktop mode.
Also corrects the Map-Features wiki: fixes the setting name
("Booking route labels" not "Show connection labels"), documents the
route_calculation requirement for travel-time pills, and explains that
overlays are off by default and must be toggled per reservation.
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# HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS=false # When true: adds includeSubDomains to the HSTS header. Only effective when HSTS is active (FORCE_HTTPS=true or NODE_ENV=production). Leave false if you run other services on sibling subdomains over plain HTTP.
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COOKIE_SECURE=true # Auto-derived (true when NODE_ENV=production or FORCE_HTTPS=true). Set false to force cookies over plain HTTP.
TRUST_PROXY=1 # Trusted proxy hops (parseInt or 1). Active in production by default; off in dev unless set. Needed for FORCE_HTTPS.
fix: add SSRF protection for link preview and Immich URL
- Create server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts with checkSsrf() and createPinnedAgent()
- Resolves DNS before allowing outbound requests to catch hostnames that
map to private IPs (closes the TOCTOU gap in the old inline checks)
- Always blocks loopback (127.x, ::1) and link-local/metadata (169.254.x)
- RFC-1918, CGNAT (100.64/10), and IPv6 ULA ranges blocked by default;
opt-in via ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK=true for self-hosters running Immich
on a local network
- createPinnedAgent() pins node-fetch to the validated IP, preventing
DNS rebinding between the check and the actual connection
- Replace isValidImmichUrl() (hostname-string check, no DNS resolution)
with checkSsrf(); make PUT /integrations/immich/settings async
- Audit log entry (immich.private_ip_configured) written when a user
saves an Immich URL that resolves to a private IP
- Response includes a warning field surfaced as a toast in the UI
- Replace ~20 lines of duplicated inline SSRF logic in the link-preview
handler with a single checkSsrf() call + pinned agent
- Document ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK in README, docker-compose.yml,
server/.env.example, chart/values.yaml, chart/templates/configmap.yaml,
and chart/README.md
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ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK=false # Allow outbound requests to private/RFC1918 IPs (e.g. Immich hosted on your LAN). Loopback and link-local addresses are always blocked.
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APP_URL=https://trek.example.com # Base URL of this instance — required when OIDC is enabled; must match the redirect URI registered with your IdP
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OIDC_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com # OpenID Connect provider URL
OIDC_CLIENT_ID=trek # OpenID Connect client ID
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=supersecret # OpenID Connect client secret
OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME=SSO # Label shown on the SSO login button
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OIDC_ONLY=true # Disable local password auth entirely (SSO only). Equivalent to setting password_login=false and password_registration=false in Admin > Settings.
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OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM=groups # OIDC claim used to identify admin users
OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE=app-trek-admins # Value of the OIDC claim that grants admin role
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OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL= # Override the auto-constructed OIDC discovery endpoint. Useful for providers (e.g. Authentik) that expose it at a non-standard path. Example: https://auth.example.com/application/o/trek/.well-known/openid-configuration
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OIDC_SCOPE=openid email profile # Fully overrides the default. Add extra scopes as needed (e.g. add groups if using OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM)
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DEMO_MODE=false # Demo mode - resets data hourly
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# MCP_RATE_LIMIT=300 # Max MCP API requests per user per minute (default: 300)
# MCP_MAX_SESSION_PER_USER=20 # Max concurrent MCP sessions per user (default: 20)
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# Initial admin account — only used on first boot when no users exist yet.
# If both are set the admin account is created with these credentials.
# If either is omitted a random password is generated and printed to the server log.
# ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@trek.local
# ADMIN_PASSWORD=changeme