2026-03-30 05:44:20 +08:00
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image:
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repository: mauriceboe/trek
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tag: latest
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pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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# Optional image pull secrets for private registries
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imagePullSecrets: []
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# - name: my-registry-secret
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service:
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type: ClusterIP
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port: 3000
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env:
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NODE_ENV: production
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PORT: 3000
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# ALLOWED_ORIGINS: ""
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fix: add SSRF protection for link preview and Immich URL
- Create server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts with checkSsrf() and createPinnedAgent()
- Resolves DNS before allowing outbound requests to catch hostnames that
map to private IPs (closes the TOCTOU gap in the old inline checks)
- Always blocks loopback (127.x, ::1) and link-local/metadata (169.254.x)
- RFC-1918, CGNAT (100.64/10), and IPv6 ULA ranges blocked by default;
opt-in via ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK=true for self-hosters running Immich
on a local network
- createPinnedAgent() pins node-fetch to the validated IP, preventing
DNS rebinding between the check and the actual connection
- Replace isValidImmichUrl() (hostname-string check, no DNS resolution)
with checkSsrf(); make PUT /integrations/immich/settings async
- Audit log entry (immich.private_ip_configured) written when a user
saves an Immich URL that resolves to a private IP
- Response includes a warning field surfaced as a toast in the UI
- Replace ~20 lines of duplicated inline SSRF logic in the link-preview
handler with a single checkSsrf() call + pinned agent
- Document ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK in README, docker-compose.yml,
server/.env.example, chart/values.yaml, chart/templates/configmap.yaml,
and chart/README.md
2026-04-01 13:53:46 +08:00
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# NOTE: If using ingress, ensure env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS matches the domains in ingress.hosts for proper CORS configuration.
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# ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK: "false"
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# Set to "true" if Immich or other integrated services are hosted on a private/RFC-1918 network address.
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# Loopback (127.x) and link-local/metadata addresses (169.254.x) are always blocked.
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2026-04-02 03:44:02 +08:00
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# COOKIE_SECURE: "true"
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# Set to "false" to allow session cookies over plain HTTP (e.g. no ingress TLS). Not recommended for production.
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# OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL: ""
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# Override the OIDC discovery endpoint for providers with non-standard paths (e.g. Authentik).
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2026-03-30 05:44:20 +08:00
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2026-04-01 12:38:38 +08:00
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# Secret environment variables stored in a Kubernetes Secret.
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# JWT_SECRET is managed entirely by the server (auto-generated into the data PVC,
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# rotatable via the admin panel) — it is not configured here.
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2026-03-30 05:44:20 +08:00
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secretEnv:
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fix: decouple at-rest encryption from JWT_SECRET, add JWT rotation
Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets
(API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that
rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data,
and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials.
- server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to
data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET);
switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the
CJS module binding live for all importers without restart
- apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from
ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET
- admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret,
persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding
via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry
- Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button
with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be
invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately
- docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml,
secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document
ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
2026-04-01 12:31:45 +08:00
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# At-rest encryption key for stored secrets (API keys, MFA, SMTP, OIDC, etc.).
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2026-04-01 15:49:57 +08:00
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# Recommended: set to a random 32-byte hex value (openssl rand -hex 32).
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# If left empty the server resolves the key automatically:
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# 1. data/.jwt_secret (existing installs — encrypted data stays readable after upgrade)
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# 2. data/.encryption_key auto-generated on first start (fresh installs)
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fix: decouple at-rest encryption from JWT_SECRET, add JWT rotation
Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets
(API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that
rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data,
and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials.
- server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to
data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET);
switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the
CJS module binding live for all importers without restart
- apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from
ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET
- admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret,
persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding
via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry
- Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button
with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be
invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately
- docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml,
secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document
ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
2026-04-01 12:31:45 +08:00
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ENCRYPTION_KEY: ""
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2026-03-30 05:44:20 +08:00
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2026-04-01 12:38:38 +08:00
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# If true, a random ENCRYPTION_KEY is generated at install and preserved across upgrades
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generateEncryptionKey: false
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2026-03-30 05:44:20 +08:00
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2026-04-01 12:38:38 +08:00
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# If set, use an existing Kubernetes secret that contains ENCRYPTION_KEY
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2026-03-30 05:44:20 +08:00
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existingSecret: ""
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2026-04-01 12:38:38 +08:00
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existingSecretKey: ENCRYPTION_KEY
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2026-03-30 05:44:20 +08:00
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persistence:
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enabled: true
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data:
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size: 1Gi
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uploads:
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size: 1Gi
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2026-03-31 07:35:12 +08:00
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 100m
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memory: 256Mi
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limits:
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cpu: 500m
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memory: 512Mi
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2026-03-30 05:44:20 +08:00
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ingress:
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enabled: false
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annotations: {}
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hosts:
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- host: chart-example.local
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paths:
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- /
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tls: []
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# - secretName: chart-example-tls
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# hosts:
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# - chart-example.local
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